Abstract-Increasingly large trip demands have strained urban transportation capacity, which consequently leads to traffic congestion. In this work, we focus on mitigating traffic congestion by incentivizing passengers to switch from private to public transit services. We address the following challenges. First, the passengers incur inconvenience costs when participating in traffic offload due to delay and discomfort, and thus need to be reimbursed. The inconvenience cost, however, is unknown to the government when choosing the incentives. Furthermore, participating in traffic offload raises privacy concerns from passengers. An adversary could infer personal information, (e.g., daily routine, region of interest, and wealth), by observing the decisions made by the government, which are known to the public. We adopt the concept of differential privacy and propose privacy-preserving incentive designs under two settings, denoted as two-way communication and one-way communication. Under two-way communication, we focus on how the government should reveal passengers' inconvenience costs to properly incentivize them while preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear program, and propose a polynomial-time approximation algorithm. We show the proposed approach achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, social optimality, and differential privacy. Under one-way communication, we focus on how the government should design the incentives without revealing passengers' inconvenience costs while still preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a convex program, and propose a differentially private and near-optimal solution algorithm. A numerical case study using Caltrans Performance Measurement System (PeMS) data source is presented as evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The trip demands of the increasing urban population have created a shortage in transportation capacity due to relatively slower development of transportation infrastructure [1] . Several strategies have been proposed to overcome this challenge [2] . A straightforward approach is to increase the capacity of transportation infrastructure by adding more lanes to existing highways and creating new highways in identified congestion areas. However, this approach is expensive and time consuming. Other than physically changing the existing transportation infrastructures, operational improvements aim at utilizing existing transportation infrastructures in a more efficient way. Transportation management centers (TMC) [2] , [3] improve highway operations by ramp metering [4] , managing traffic flow when incidents happen [5] , and reporting real-time information about weather and route conditions [6] . The last category focuses on demand side management. The intuition of the approaches belonging to this category is to serve more passengers using less vehicles so that the congestion can be mitigated. Typical strategies include ridesharing [7] , [8] {lniu,aclark}@wpi.edu alternative travel options (e.g., bicycle/pedestrian) [9] , and pricing scheme design [10] - [12] .
In this work, we focus on demand side management. In particular, we investigate how to incentivize passengers to switch from private transit service (PVTS) to public transit service (PBTS). Before analyzing how to incentivize the passengers, we first characterize PVTS (e.g., taxis and ridehailing service) and PBTS (e.g., buses and subways). PVTS provides passengers high quality of service (QoS) with few or no stop, and high flexibility in terms of route selection and travel time. However, PVTS normally charges high fares. PBTS provides a group of passengers a shared ride following a fixed route and schedule time table. Although PBTS sacrifices QoS, passengers incur less fares.
By the nature of PVTS and PBTS, we observe that if more passengers are willing to switch from PVTS to PBTS to satisfy their trip demands, the number of operating vehicles decreases and therefore congestion can be mitigated. However, there are several difficulties to incentivize passengers to switch from PVTS to PBTS. First, passengers incur inconvenience costs while changing their transit behavior by switching from PVTS to PBTS. The inconvenience cost is due to several factors including reduced QoS and delay of arrival time. Thus the passengers need to be reimbursed. Moreover, the inconvenience cost, which varies from passenger to passenger depending on the preference of each passenger, is unknown to the government and the passengers are not willing to reveal their inconvenience cost functions since the inconvenience cost functions contain personal information such as region of interest and daily routine. Finally, the passengers have privacy concerns when participating in traffic offload. A privacy sensitive passenger might lie on its inconvenience cost when revealing it due to privacy concerns to achieve privacy guarantees at the expense of sub-optimal utility. Therefore, the government needs to design a mechanism which not only incentivizes the passengers to switch from PVTS to PBTS, but also addresses their privacy concerns.
In this paper, we focus on the mechanism design to incentivize the passengers to switch from PVTS to PBTS. We make the following contributions.
• We formulate the problem of mechanism design to incentivize passengers to switch from PVST to PBST under two settings, including two-way communication between the government and passengers and one-way communication from the government to the passengers.
We present an adversary model under each setting that characterizes passengers' privacy concerns.
• We model the interaction between the government and passenger under two-way communication using a reverse auction model. We formulate the problem as a mixed
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present literature review on intelligent transportation system and differential privacy. Significant research effort has been devoted to achieving intelligent and sustainable transportation system. Planning and routing navigation problems have been investigated by transportation and control communities [13] - [18] . These works focus on finding the optimal path for each vehicle, and are not sufficient to address the imbalance between trip demands and transportation capacity. Various approaches have been proposed to improve operation efficiency of existing transportation infrastructure, among which vehicle balancing [19] has been extensively studied for bike sharing [20] and taxis [21] . Metering strategy has also been investigated [4] . Different from works mentioned above, this paper focuses on the demand side management.
In the following, we discuss related works on demand side management. Alternative travel facilities have been implemented all over the world, e.g., bike sharing system [22] . Moreover, ridesharing system and the associated ridesharing match system has been investigated [23] , [24] , which grouped passengers with similar itineraries and time schedules together to reduce the number of operating vehicles. Most of these works focus on taxis and ride-hailing services such as Uber and Lyft, and ignore the potential from PBTS. Pricing schemes have been proposed to reduce the number of operating vehicles at peak hour [10] - [12] . These works focus on private cars and ignore the PBTS. This paper fills the gap in existing literature by considering the switch from PVTS to PBTS. Researchers have identified the factors that prevent passengers from PBTS [25] , [26] . However, to the best of our knowledge, it has received little research attention on how to incentivize passengers to switch from private to public transit services.
Mechanism design has recently been used in engineering applications such as cloud computing. In particular, VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [27] is widely used to preserve truthfulness. However, truthful communication raises the privacy concerns. To address the privacy issue, we adopt the concept of differential privacy [28] - [30] . Mechanism design with differential privacy, such as exponential mechanism, has been proposed [30] - [33] . However, they are not readily applicable to the problem investigated in this paper because the presence of inconvenience cost functions leads to violation on individual rationality. Moreover, the computation complexity in exponential mechanism is addressed in this paper.
Trial-and-error implementation for toll pricing has been proposed in [34] . Different from [34] , we consider a closedloop Stackelberg information pattern, and compute the optimal incentive price. To solve the problem under one-way communication setting, we adopt the Laplace mechanism to preserve differential privacy [30] . This paper extends our preliminary conference version [35] , in which two-way communication setting is studied. We extend the preliminary work by investigating the one-way communication setting.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first give the problem overview. Then we present the problem formulations under two settings, denoted as two-way communication and one-way communication. We finally discuss the privacy model.
A. Problem Overview
Let S = {1, · · · , S} denote the set of origin-destination (OD) pairs that will require traffic offload in the near future time horizon t = 1, · · · , T , with each OD pair s ∈ S requiring Q s,t amount of traffic offload at time t. Let N = {1, · · · , N } be the set of passengers. At each time t, any passenger i ∈ N that participates in traffic offload for any OD pair s ∈ S receives revenue r i,s,t (q i,s,t ) issued by the government, where q i,s,t ≥ 0 is the amount of traffic offload that passenger i can provide for OD pair s at time t. Passenger i also incurs inconvenience cost C i,s (q i,s,t ) if it switches from private to public transit service due to discomfort and time of arrival delays. We remark that each passenger is physically located close to some OD pair s at each time t. Hence each passenger is only willing to participate in traffic offload for one OD pair s that is physically close to its current location. For other OD pairs s = s, we can regard the associated inconvenience cost approaches infinity. We assume that the inconvenience cost function C i,s (q i,s,t ) is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing with respect to q i,s,t for all s ∈ S, and convex with C i,s (0) = 0 for all i and s. The utility of the passenger at each time step t is given by
In this work, we assume the passengers are selfish and rational, i.e., the passengers selfishly maximize their utilities and never accept negative utilities.
B. Case 1: Interaction with Two-way Communication
In this subsection, we present the problem formulation under two-way communication setting. In this case, the interaction between the government and the set of passengers is captured by a reverse auction model.
The passengers act as the bidders. Each passenger can submit a bid b i,t = [b i,1,t , · · · , b i,S,t ] to the government at each time t, where element b i,s,t = (q i,s,t ,C i,s (q i,s,t )) contains the amount of traffic offload that passenger i can provide and the associated inconvenience cost. Note thatC i,s (q i,s,t ) is the inconvenience cost claimed by passenger i, which does not necessarily equal the true cost C i,s (q i,s,t ).
The government is the auctioneer. It collects the bids from all passengers, and then selects a set of passengers that should participate in traffic offload. In particular, the government computes a selection profile X ∈ {0, 1} N ×S×T , with each element x i,s,t = 1 if passenger i is selected and 0 otherwise. If a passenger i is selected by the government for OD pair s, an associated incentive r i,s,t (q i,s,t ) is issued to passenger i.
The utility (1) of each passenger i at time t is rewritten as
The social welfare can be represented as
where B contains b i,t for all i and t. The government aims at maximizing social welfare Ω(X, B). This social welfare maximization problem is given as
Constraint (4b) implies that a passenger can only be selected for one OD pair at each time t. Constraint (4c) requires the desired traffic offload Q s,t must be satisfied for all s and t. Constraint (4d) defines binary variable x i,s,t . Under the two-way communication setting, a malicious adversary aims at inferring the inconvenience cost function of each passenger by observing the selection profile X. The adversary can observe X be eavesdropping on communication channel. Let X t be the selection profile at time t. Then the information perceived by the adversary up to time t is I mal t = {X t |t ≤ t}. In this case, the government needs to compute a privacy preserving incentive mechanism such that the passengers truthfully report their inconvenience cost functions so that the social welfare is (approximately) optimal.
Besides the privacy guarantees, we state some additional desired properties that the government needs to achieve under this two-way communication setting. First, individual rationality for each passenger should be guaranteed, i.e., each passenger must obtain non-negative utility when contributing to traffic offload. Second, the incentive design is required to be social welfare maximizing. Third, the government wishes to reveal the true inconvenience cost functions from the passengers to seek the optimal solution to (4) . Therefore the government needs to ensure that the passengers bid truthfully. Truthfulness is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Truthfulness).
An auction is truthful if and only if bidding the true inconvenience cost function, i.e., C i,s (q i,s,t ) = C i,s (q i,s,t ) for all q i,s,t , is the dominant strategy for any passenger i regardless of the bids from the other passengers. In other words, biddingC i,s (q i,s,t ) = C i,s (q i,s,t ) maximizes the utility (2) of passenger i for all i.
C. Case 2: Interaction with One-way Communication
In this subsection, we present a problem formulation when two-way communication is infeasible, while one-way communication from the government to the passengers is enabled. Under this setting, the passengers cannot report any information to the government. The government hence broadcasts an incentive price p s,t for each OD pair s at each time step t, and then observes the responses from the passengers to design the incentive price for next time step (t + 1). Different from twoway communication, the passengers respond to the incentive price rather than bidding a fixed amount of traffic offload. Hence, we define the amount of traffic offload provided by each passenger i for OD pair s at time t is defined as a function of incentive price p s,t , and denote it as q i,s (p s,t ). We assume that the the traffic offload q i,s (p s,t ) provided by each passenger i is strictly increasing with respect to p s,t .
The government predicts the traffic condition for the set of OD pairs S = {1, 2, · · · , S} in the near future time horizon t = 1, · · · , T based on the historical traffic information (e.g., traffic conditions during rush hours). Suppose the government requires Q s,t ≥ 0 amount of traffic offload on OD pair s at each time index t. To satisfy Q s,t amount of traffic offload, the government designs a unit incentive price p s,t for each time index t to incentivize individual passengers to participate in the traffic offload program. The information perceived by the government I gov t up to time t includes the following: (i) the historical incentives {p s,t |t = 1, · · · , t − 1, s ∈ S}, (ii) the historical traffic offload offered by the passengers {q i,s (p s,t )|i ∈ N , s ∈ S, t = 1, · · · , t − 1}. Thus the government's decision on p s,t for each time t and OD pair s can be interpreted as a policy mapping from the information set to the set of non-negative real numbers p s,t : I gov t → R ≥0 . At each time step t, the passengers observe the incentives p s,t , and then decide whether to participate in traffic offload and earn the incentive p s,t q i,s (p s,t ) based on their own utility functions. Passengers that participate in traffic offload incur inconvenience cost C i,s (q i,s (p s,t )). The inconvenience cost function C i,s (q i,s (p s,t )) is private to each passenger i. The information I i t available to passenger i up to time t includes the following: (i) the historical incentives {p s,t |t = 1, · · · , t, s ∈ S}, (ii) the traffic offload function {q i,s (·)|s ∈ S}, and (iii) its inconvenience cost function {C i,s (·)|s ∈ S}.
be the incentive prices for all OD pairs s ∈ S at time t. The utility of each passenger i at time step t can be represented as
The social cost is given by
where
the incentive prices for all s and t, [·]
+ represents max{·, 0}, and β s represents the penalty due to deficit of traffic offload. The social cost minimization problem (or equivalently the social cost minimization problem) is formulated as min p Ω(p).
Under the one-way communication setting, the malicious party could not observe the participation of each passenger directly as in two-way communication setting. We focus on a malicious party that can observe the incentive prices issued by the government up to time t and then infer the amount of traffic offload offered by each passenger i, which might be further used to infer the inconvenience cost functions of the passengers. Denote the information obtained by the government up to time t as I mal t . Then we have I mal t = {p s,t |∀s, ∀t ≤ t}. The objective of a malicious party is to compute q i,s (p s,t ) given I mal t . In this case, the government's objective is to compute a privacy preserving incentive design such that the social welfare is (approximately) maximized.
Besides the privacy guarantee, we briefly discuss the gametheoretic properties under one-way communication setting. Since the government broadcasts the incentive price while the passengers decide if they will participate or not, individual rationality is automatically guaranteed for rational passengers. Truthfulness is not required under one-way communication setting since the passengers cannot send messages to the government under this setting.
D. Notion of Privacy
In this subsection, we give the notion of privacy adopted in this paper. We focus on differential privacy [28] , [29] , which is defined as follows.
Definition 2. ( -Differential Privacy.) Given ≥ 0, a computation procedure M is said to be -differentially private if for any two inputs C 1 and C 2 that differ in a single element and for any set of outcomes L ⊆ Range(M ), the relationship
holds, where Range(M ) is the set of all outcomes of M .
Definition 2 requires computation procedure M to behave similarly given similar inputs, where parameter models how similarly the procedure should behave. A more relaxed and general definition of differential privacy is as follows.
Definition 3. (( , δ)-Differential Privacy.) Given ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0, a computation procedure M is said to be ( , δ)-differentially private if for any two inputs C 1 and C 2 that differ in a single element and for any set of outcomes
To quantify the privacy leakage using the proposed incentive designs, we adopt the concept of min-entropy leakage [36] . We first introduce the concepts of min-entropy and conditional min-entropy [37] , and then define the min-entropy leakage. Let V and Y be random variables. The min-entropy of V is defined as H ∞ (V ) = lim α→∞
α , where P r(V = v) represents the probability of V = v. The conditional min-entropy is defined as H ∞ (V |Y ) = − log 2 y P r(Y = y) max v P r(v|y), where P r(v|y) is the probability that V = v given that Y = y. Then the min-entropy leakage [36] 
Under two-way communication setting, the min-entropy leakage is computed as
where P r(B) is the probability that a bidding profile B is submitted, and P r(B|X) is the probability that the bidding profile B is submitted given the selection profile X is observed. Under one-way communication setting, the minentropy leakage is computed as
where P r(C) is the probability that the collection of passengers' inconvenience cost functions is C, and P r(C|p) is the probability that the collection of inconvenience costs is C given the historical incentives p is observed.
IV. SOLUTION FOR TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION SETTING
Motivated by exponential mechanism [31] , [32] , we present an incentive design for the two-way communication setting in this section. We propose a payment scheme that achieves individual rationality. We mitigate the computation complexity incurred in exponential mechanism using an iterative algorithm. We prove that the desired properties are achieved using the proposed incentive design.
A. Solution Approach
In this subsection, we give an exact solution under two-way communication. We formally prove that truthfulness, approximate social welfare maximizing, and differential privacy are achieved using the proposed mechanism.
The mechanism is presented in Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes the bid profile from the passengers as input, and gives the selection profile X and the incentives issued to each selected passenger. The algorithm works as follows. At each time t ≤ T , the government selects a feasible solution to social welfare maximization problem (4) . The probability of selecting each feasible X is proportional to the exponential function evaluated at the associated social welfare Ω(X, B) with scale 2∆ , where ∆ is the difference between the upper and lower bound of social welfare Ω(X, B). Although the computation of selection profile X is motivated by exponential mechanism [31] , [32] , the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-like payment scheme adopted by exponential mechanism is not applicable to the problem investigated in this work. The reason is that the VCG-like payment scheme violated individual rationality and truthfulness in our case, due to the fact that the passengers do not only have valuations over the incentives, but also inconvenience costs during traffic offload. To this end, the payment scheme (8) is proposed for the problem of interest, in which the incentive issued to each passenger is determined by the social cost introduced by each passenger. In the following, we characterize the mechanism presented in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. The mechanism described in Algorithm 1 achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, near optimal social welfare, and -differential privacy.
Proof. We omit the proof due to space limit. See [35] for a detailed proof.
The mechanism proposed in Algorithm 1 is computationally expensive. The payment scheme (8) is intractable when the passenger set is large since (8) needs to compute the social welfare associated with X and X −i for all i. Therefore, a computationally efficient algorithm is desired.
B. Efficient Algorithm
Algorithm 1 is computationally intensive and hence we need an efficient algorithm. In this subsection, we give a mechanism that achieves the desired game-theoretic properties and privacy guarantees and runs in polynomial time.
In real world implementation, since the passengers are geographically distributed, the government can decompose the social welfare maximization problem (4) with respect to OD pair s. Then problem (4) becomes a set of optimization problems associated with each OD pair s as follows:
s.t. i∈N x i,s,t q i,s,t ≥ Q s,t , ∀s, t x i,s,t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, s, t.
Given the set of decomposed problems, if we can achieve the optimal solution to each decomposed problem using an incentive design, then we reach social optimal solution. Thus our objective is design a mechanism that achieves the (approximate) optimal solution of each decomposed problem, individual rationality, truthfulness, and differential privacy. Input: Bid profile B
3:
Output: Selection profile X, incentives R 4:
Choose a selection profile X that is feasible for social welfare maximization problem (4) with probability P r(X) ∝ exp 2∆ Ω(X, B) .
6:
For each passenger that is selected, issue incentive r i as
where ∆ is the difference between the upper and lower bound of social welfare Ω(X, B), E(·) is the Shannon entropy, D(·) is the probability distribution over selection profile B, and X −i,t and B −i,t are the matrix obtained by removing the i-th row and i-th column in selection profile and bid profile, respectively.
7:
end while 9: end procedure
The proposed efficient algorithm for each decomposed problem is presented in Algorithm 2. The algorithm iteratively computes the set of passengers W s,t selected by the government for OD pair s at time t. First, the set W s,t is initialized as an empty set. Then at each iteration k, the probability that selecting a passenger i that has not been selected at time t is proportional to the exponential function exp (q i,s,t −C i,s (q i,s,t )) , i.e.,
where = e ln(e/δ) . Then the set of selected passengers W s,t are removed from the passenger set N . For each i ∈ W s,t , the government issues incentive r i,s,t computed as
where z =C i,s(qi,s,t ) exp( (qi,s,t−Ci,s(qi,s,t)))
. We characterize the solution presented in Algorithm 2 as follows. 1) , where Ω * s is the maximum social welfare for OD pair s.
Proof. We omit the proof due to space limit. See [35] for detailed proof.
Given Algorithm 2 for each decomposed problem, we present Algorithm 3, which utilizes Algorithm 2 as subroutine, to solve for the selection profile X for problem (4) Input: Bid profile B, current time t
Output: Selection profile W s,t
4:
Initialization: Selected passenger set W s,t ← ∅, ← e ln(e/δ)
5:
while |W s,t | ≤ Q s ∧ N = ∅ do 6:
Compute the probability of selecting passenger i as (10). Remove all passengers that provide negative social
for s ∈ S do return X = ∪ s∈S W s,t
12:
t ← t + 1 13: end while 14: end procedure We conclude this section by characterizing the properties achieved by Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, and ∆S e(e−1) , δS -differential privacy. Moreover, Algorithm 2 achieves near optimal social welfare Ω * − SO(ln Q s ) with at least probability 1 −
, where Ω * is the maximum social welfare and Q * = max s Q s .
V. SOLUTION FOR ONE-WAY COMMUNICATION SETTING
In this section, we analyze the problem formulated in Section III-C. We first present an incentive mechanism design without privacy guarantee. Then we give the incentive mechanism design that satisfies differential privacy.
A. Incentive Mechanism Design without Privacy Guarantee
Different from the two-way communication scenario, the passengers observe the incentive price signal sent by the government and respond to it by maximizing their own utility. In the following, we first analyze passengers' best responses to price signal. Then we analyze how the government should design the incentive price to achieve optimal social welfare.
Lemma 2.
Given an incentive price p s,t , a selfish and rational passenger would contribute q i,s (p s,t ) = C −1 i,s (q i,s (p s,t )) + amount of traffic offload to maximize its utility U i,t (p t ).
Proof. Let s ∈ S be the OD pair that passenger i can contribute to. Then for any s = s, we have q i,s (p s ,t ) = 0. Given an incentive price p s,t , the maximizer of U i,t (p t ) can be computed as the solution to p s,t = C i,s (q i,s (p s,t )) due to the convexity of C i,s (·). Therefore, we have that if the incentive price p s,t is no less than the marginal cost of contributing C i,s (0) for each passenger i, then passenger i participates in traffic offload. By solving p s,t = C i,s (q i,s (p s,t )) for q i,s (p s,t ),
where the operator [·]
+ is due to the fact that q i,s (p s,t ) ≥ 0, and the existence of the solution follows by the convexity of C i,s (·).
We have the following two observations by Lemma 2. First, a selfish and rational passenger that optimizes its utility will contribute the amount of traffic offload C −1 i,s (q i,s (p s,t )) if and only if it can obtain non-negative utility. Moreover, by observing the participation of each passenger, the government can infer the gradients of inconvenience cost functions.
Taking the gradient of inconvenience cost function of each participating passenger C −1 i,s (p s,t ) as feedback, the government can then use the gradient descent algorithm [38] to approximately minimize the social cost. In Algorithm 4, the government first initializes a set of learning rates {η 1 , · · · , η T } that adjusts the step size between two time instants. In the meanwhile, Algorithm 4 initializes p 1 of small value for time t = 1. Then for each time step t = 2, · · · , T , the government iteratively updates the incentive price p t+1 as max p s,t − i η t C i,s (q * i,s ), 0 . In the following, we characterize Algorithm 4 by analyzing the social cost incurred using the incentive price returned by Algorithm 4. Analogous to online convex algorithm [38] , we define the regret of the government. The regret over time horizon T is defined as where Ω(p) is the social cost when when selecting a sequence of incentive prices {p s,t } S,T s=1,t=1 as defined in (6) , and
is the optimal social cost when using a fixed price. Then the regret (12) models the difference between the social cost when selecting a sequence of incentive prices {p t } T t=1 and optimal social cost from using a fixed price p * s for each s. In the following, we characterize the mechanism design proposed for one-way communication by analyzing the regret (12) . In particular, we analyze the regret (12) by showing that it satisfies Hannan consistency, i.e., lim sup
The Hannan consistency implies that the average regret (14) vanishes when time horizon approaches infinity. We define the following notations. Define row vectors g s,t ∈ R N and h s,t ∈ R N as :
We denote the vectors g s,t and h s,t that are associated with p s,t = p * s as g * s,t and h * s,t , respectively. Letḡ = max s,t g s,t (p s,t ) and g = min s,t g s,t . Denote the maximum incentive price the government would issue asp. We also define column vectors for all s and t as q s,t = [q 1,s (p s,t ), · · · , q N,s (p s,t )]
T . Similarly, vector q * s,t represents the vector associated with p s,t = p * s . We finally define k s,t = g s,t ·h s,t +β s h s,t 1 N , where g s,t ·h s,t is the dot product of g s,t and h s,t . Letk = max s,t k s,t be the maximum k s,t for all s and t. Next we show that regret (12) is upper bounded.
Lemma 3. The regret of Algorithm 4 is bounded as
Proof. The proof is motivated by [38] . Denote the optimal incentive price associated with optimal social cost Ω * as p * s for each OD pair s. Due to convexity of inconvenience cost functions C i,s (·), for any q i,s (p s,t ) and p s,t we have
By definition of g s,t (15), we have that the optimal social cost satisfies the following inequalities:
T with dimension N , inequality (18) follows by the convexity of C i,s (·), inequality (19) follows by concavity of q i,s (·), and inequality (20) holds by the fact that
Rearranging the inequality above, we have that
where k s,t = g s,t · h s,t + β s h s,t 1 N , and g s,t · h s,t represents the dot product of g s,t and h s,t .
At time step t + 1, we have
where inequality (21) holds by the updating rule of p s,t and inequality (22) holds due to g s,t 1 N ≤ḡN . Then we obtain
By definition (12), we have
which completes our proof.
Leveraging Lemma 3, we are ready to show Hannan consistency holds for the proposed incentive mechanism design. Proof. The average regret satisfies
where the first inequality holds by Lemma 3, the second inequality holds by the facts thatk = max s,t k s,t and g = max s,t g s,t . Moreover, we have
2gT , which approaches zero as T → ∞. Therefore, we have that the Hannan consistency holds.
B. Incentive Mechanism Design with Privacy Guarantee
In this subsection, we give the differentially private incentive price p s,t under the one-way communication setting.
To achieve the privacy guarantee, we perturb the incentive price returned by Algorithm 4 as follows:
where δ t ∼ L ∆p is a random variable that follows Laplace distribution with scale ∆p/ , and ∆p is the maximum difference of the incentive price under two set of observations that differ in one passenger, which can be obtained by solving max s,t,qs,t,q s,t p s,t+1 − p s,t+1
where p s,t+1 and p s,t+1 are incentive prices returned by Algorithm 4 given traffic offloads q s,t and q s,t , respectively.
In the sequel, we analyze how privacy is preserved. We start with analysis for a single time step. Then we generalize our analysis to multiple time steps. (p s,1 ). Let p s,2 = p s,2 be the incentive price issued by the government for time t = 2 and OD pair s associated with incentive prices p s,1 and p s,1 , respectively. Let P and P be the probability density functions of incentive computation given I gov 2 and I gov 2 , respectively. Then the following inequality holds:
That is, the proposed incentive design (23) preserves
Proof. Since the passengers' utility function is deterministic, given an incentive price p s,t , passengers' participation is deterministic. Given the initial incentive price p s,1 at t = 1, 
where the inequality follows from triangle inequality, and the last equality follows by Lemma 2. Thus we have (1 − η 1 ) -differential privacy.
In the following, we generalize Lemma 4 into multiple time step scenario. Proof. We prove by inducting Lemma 4 over multiple time steps. We note that since the scheme follows Stackelberg setting, a malicious party can only infer the passengers' behavior at time t = 1 by observing p s,2 . Thus, Lemma 4 serves as our induction base. At time t, the information perceived by the malicious party is I mal t = {p s,t |∀s, t = 1, · · · , t}. We analyze the ratio of P (ps,t)
under the under the following scenarios. First, if p s,t = p s,t for all t < t and p s,t distinguishes from p s,t as assumed in Lemma 4. Then we have (1 − η t )-differential privacy by applying Lemma 4. In the following, we focus on the general setting in which p s,t differs from p s,t for all t < t such that q s,1:t and q s,1:t differ at at most one entry. Then we have
Therefore, we have that the proposed approach achieves
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the social welfare using the incentive design (23) . We start with the expected regret defined as the probabilistic counter-part of (12):
where E p {·} represents expectation with respect to p.
Lemma 5. The expected regret E{R(T )} under incentive (23) is bounded from above as
Proof. The proof is the probabilistic counter-part of that of Lemma 3.
Before closing this section, we finally show Hannan consistency holds under incentive design (23) To prove Theorem 4, we first give the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let P r(·) be the probability of an event. Then the following inequality holds P r lim sup
Sk max
Proof. Let
Then V can be interpreted as the following two statements for all for all φ > 0:
Then by the property of limit superior for sequence of sets, we have that (26) holds.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 4.) Letk = max s,t k s,t be the maximum k s,t for all s and t, and g = min s,t g s,t . Then following the proof of Lemma 3, we have
. Summing the inequality above over t and s, we have
Let P r(·) be the probability of an event. Then we have P r lim sup
≥ lim sup
= lim sup
where inequality (27) holds by Lemma 6, inequality (28) holds by (23) and definition of δ t . Therefore, we have Hannan consistency holds.
VI. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY

A. Case Study Setup
We consider a government aiming at initiating traffic offload for S = 5 OD pairs for the next day. Suppose the time horizon T = 24 and each time slot t is set as 1 hour. The desired amount of traffic offload at each OD pair is obtained from [39] . We use the peak volume traffic data in 2017. The 5 roads that we used in the data set are county 'INY' with direction S, county 'LA' with direction N , county 'KER' with direction W , county 'FRE' with direction S, and county 'IMP' with direction S. If a road appears multiple times in the data source, we take the average over the peak volume as the data used in the case study. To show the performance of traffic offload, we use the ahead peak hour traffic volume in [39] as the traffic volume without traffic offload. Since the ahead hourly traffic volume data is not available, we treat the ahead traffic data at different post mile as the traffic volume data at different time.
The size of the passenger set is N = 50000. We assume the inconvenience cost function C i,s (q i,s ) of each passenger i is a linear combination of four factors denoted as comfort, reliability, delay on time of arrival, and cost [25] , [26] . Different passenger assigns different weights on these factors. The weights for each passenger are generated using a multivariate normal distribution, with mean [0.16, 0.27, 0.36, 0.21] and variance 0.3I, where I is identity matrix [26] .
B. Two-way Communication
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed approach for the two-way communication scenario. We first generate the passengers' bids. As shown in Theorem 2, the passengers bid truthfully to the government, and hence the government knows the inconvenience cost function of each passenger. The amount of traffic offload that contributed by each passenger is generated using a normal distribution with mean 3.5 and variance 0.3. We remark that the contributions model the best effort of all passengers, i.e., the capabilities of all passengers.
We compute the incentives and selection profile following Algorithm 3. First, we show the traffic volume on each OD pair before and after traffic offload in Fig. 1a to Fig. 1e . The solid curve is the traffic volume before traffic offload, whereas the dashed curve represents the traffic volume after traffic offload. As observed in Fig. 1a to Fig. 1e , the traffic volume decreases by incentivizing the passengers to switch from private to public transit services. Moreover, the gap between the solid curve and dashed curve gives the amount of traffic offload due to passengers switching from private to public transit services. We next present the social welfare for each OD pair in Fig.  1a to Fig. 1e . We observe that by initiating the traffic offload program, the government earns non-negative social welfare for all time t on each OD pair. We finally give the traffic condition improvement and average payment received by each passenger for each OD pair at 12 : 00 PM in Table I We present the min-entropy leakage in Fig. 4a to validate that the proposed incentive design in Algorithm 3 is privacy preserving. We compute the min-entropy for OD pair 'INY' Fig. 2a to Fig. 2e , we present the social welfare at each OD pair.
at 12 : 00 PM when differential privacy parameter varies from 0.01 to 1. We observe that the min-entropy is monotone increasing with respect to parameter , which agrees with our privacy preserving property. That is, when the mechanism is designed with stronger privacy guarantee, there exists less minentropy leakage for each individual passenger. Fig. 4b shows Min-entropy leakage L for OD pair INY over time.
C. One-way Communication
In this subsection, we demonstrate the proposed approach for the one-way communication scenario. The government initializes a first guess of incentive price 0.02$. Given the incentive price p s,t , the response from each passenger is computed by Lemma 2. The capability of each passenger is adopted from the setting under two-way communication.
We present the traffic volume on each OD pair before and after traffic offload in Fig. 3a to Fig. 3e . We have the following observations. First, the traffic volume decreases due to passengers switching from private to public transit services. Similar to Fig. 1a to Fig. 1e , the gap between the curves represents the amount of traffic offload. Finally, the traffic volume after traffic offload is lower than that under two-way communication setting for some time t, i.e., the amount of traffic offload contributed by the passengers is higher than that under two-way communication setting. The reasons are two fold. First, the government does not know the inconvenience cost function of each passenger under the oneway communication setting and has no ability to select the participating passengers. Therefore, the participating passengers could contribute more than Q s,t for all s and t under one-way communication setting. However, the government selects the winners under two-way communication setting and only Q s,t amount of traffic offload is realized for all s and t. Second, the passengers' inconvenience costs are modeled as linear function. Hence any passenger i such that p s,t ≥ C i,s (q i,s ) would participate in traffic offload by shedding the maximum amount of traffic offload, i.e., contribute its maximum effort.
We finally present the min-entropy leakage for OD pair (INY) under one-way communication setting in Fig. 4b . In this case study, parameter is set as 0.015. We show how privacy is preserved over time. We observe that the privacy leakage increases over time. The reason is that the malicious party perceives more information over time. Hence, more information can be inferred by the adversary as time increases.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the problem of incentivizing passengers to switch from private to public transit service to mitigate traffic congestion and achieve sustainability. We consider two settings denoted as two-way communication and one-way communication. We model the interaction under former setting using a reverse auction model and propose a polynomial time algorithm to solve for an approximate solution that achieves approximate social optimal, truthfulness, individual rationality, and differential privacy. In the latter setting, we present a convex program to solve for the incentive price. The proposed approach achieves Hannan consistency and differential privacy. The proposed approaches are evaluated using a numerical case study with real-world trace data.
